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Introduction 
A Brief Description of the Program  
The U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade program was established as a result of the enactment 
of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (1990 CAAA) under the authority granted by 
Title IV, which included several measures to reduce precursor emissions of acid 
deposition.2 The SO2 component consisted of a two-phase, cap-and-trade program for 
reducing SO2 emissions from fossil-fuel burning power plants located in the continental 
forty-eight states of the United States. During Phase I, lasting from 1995 through 1999, 
electric generating units larger than 100 MWe in generating capacity with an annual 
average emission rate in 1985 greater than 2.5 pounds of SO2 per million Btu of heat 
input in 1985 (hereafter, #SO2/mmBtu) were required to reduce emissions to a level that 
would be, on average, no greater than 2.5 #SO2/mmBtu. In Phase II, beginning in 2000 
and continuing indefinitely, the program was expanded to include fossil-fuel electricity 
generating units greater than 25 MWe, or virtually all fossil-fuel power plants in the 
United States. Emissions from these affected units are limited, after accounting for any 
allowances banked from Phase I, to an annual cap of 8.9 million tons, or about half of 
total electric utility SO2 emissions in the early 1980s. The Phase II cap is equivalent to an 
                                                 
1 This paper was prepared as a case study report under the program for the “Ex Post Evaluation of Tradable 
Permits: Methodological and Policy Issues” being conducted by the National Policies Division of the 
Environmental Directorate of the OECD. 
2 The most important of the other measures reduced NOx emissions by two million tons by imposing 
technology-based, maximum average annual NOx emission rates on affected sources. In meeting these 
standards, utilities were allowed to average emission rates among the units they controlled, but not to trade 
NOx emissions among utilities. 
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average emission rate of 1.2 #SO2/mmBtu, when divided by the mid-1980s level of heat 
input at fossil-fuel burning power plants. 
This cap on national SO2 emissions was implemented by issuing tradable 
allowances—representing the right to emit one ton of SO2 emissions—equal in total to 
annual allowed emissions from affected units in each year after 1995, and by requiring 
that the owners of these units surrender an allowance for every ton of SO2 emitted. 
Allowances not used in the year for which they are allocated can be carried over or 
banked for future use by the original owner or by any party to whom the banked 
allowance is sold. Allowances are allocated to owners of affected units free of charge for 
the next thirty years, generally in proportion to each unit’s average annual heat input 
during the three-year baseline period, 1985-87. A small percentage (2.8 percent) of the 
allowances allocated to affected units are withheld for sale through an annual auction 
conducted by the EPA to encourage trading and to ensure the availability of allowances 
for new generating units. The revenues from this auction are returned on a pro rata basis 
to the owners from whose allocations the allowances were withheld.  
The SO2 cap-and-trade program also contained several provisions that allowed 
generating units not subject to the cap until Phase II to opt-in to Phase I and to receive 
allowances for the year in which the unit participated. These units were then subject to 
the same compliance requirements as the 263 units that were mandated to be part of 
Phase I, namely, that they must surrender allowances equal to emissions in that year. 
Also, SO2-emitting industrial sources not otherwise affected by Title IV could establish 
baselines and be allocated allowances and participate like any other unit in Phases I and 
II. 
The Political and Regulatory Context of Title IV 
Three features of the political and regulatory context are important in evaluating 
the SO2 cap-and-trade program. The first is that the cap-and-trade system is not the only 
means, nor the first means, of controlling SO2 emissions from electric utility power plants 
in the United States. The cap-and-trade system supplements an extensive set of 
command-and-control regulations that has been in effect since the early 1970s. These 
regulations take two principal forms according to whether power plants were in existence 
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when the regulations implementing the 1970 Clean Air Act Amendments became 
effective. Plants already in existence or under construction in 1971 must meet emission 
rate limits imposed by State Implementation Plans (SIPs), which the individual states are 
required to develop in order to bring all areas of the country into compliance with 
National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for six “criteria” pollutants (including 
SO2). New units constructed after the effective date of the 1970 Amendments are 
required to meet the New Source Performance Standard (NSPS), which is a technology-
based, uniform national requirement that, in the case of SO2, effectively requires new 
coal-fired generating plants to install flue gas desulfurization equipment (or a scrubber).3  
New sources have additional requirements if they are to be located in areas not in 
attainment with the NAAQS (non-attainment areas). Sources locating in areas that are in 
attainment may also face prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) requirements, 
which are intended to ensure that areas in attainment do not slip into non-attainment 
status. Finally, any source located near a national park or other pristine (Class I) area may 
be required to meet additional limits, such as those aimed at preserving visibility. 
Typically, all of these pre-existing regulatory requirements impose either emission rate 
limits or technology mandates on individual units. This complex and comprehensive, 
underlying command-and-control structure means that Title IV is not burdened with 
meeting all environmental objectives. Other regulatory mechanisms are available to 
ensure that adverse local health effects are avoided and that other environmental values, 
such as visibility, are preserved. Another consequence of this regulatory context is that 
the ability of individual power plants to participate in emissions trading can be, and often 
is, limited by these other requirements. 
The second notable feature of the political and regulatory context is that the 
motives lying behind enactment of Title IV are mixed, as is the case for most legislation. 
The ostensible purpose and most commonly cited motive is to reduce the effects of acid 
deposition, a cumulative environmental problem, the effects of which are experienced 
                                                 
3  The scrubber mandate for new units was added by the 1977 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. The 
original NSPS provisions of the 1970 Clean Air Act required only that emissions from new coal-fired 
power plants be limited to 1.2 #SO2/mmBtu. This standard was achievable either by installing a scrubber or 
switching to a limited sub-set of coals (thereafter known as compliance coals) that emitted less than 1.2 
#SO2/mmBtu without scrubbing. Ackerman and Hassler (1981) provide the now classic account of the 
interest group politics and other considerations leading to the redefinition of the NSPS. 
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mainly in the Northeast in large part as a result of SO2 emissions originating from the 
heavy concentration of coal-fired power plants in the Mid-West. Yet, SO2 emissions from 
power plants located in other parts of the country, such as Florida, that have little effect 
on the Northeast or other areas suffering from acidic deposition are included in the Acid 
Rain Program; and emissions from these sources are considered, for the purposes of 
emissions trading, as completely equivalent to emissions from power plants located in 
areas that are far more likely, given the prevailing patterns of atmospheric transportation, 
to have an affect on sensitive receptor areas. Two other motives operated at the time of 
enactment. The first concerned fine particulates, which research on health effects was 
beginning to implicate as a threat to public health. Although considerable controversy 
surrounded the origin of fine particulates—and such questions would need to be resolved 
in order to revise the appropriate NAAQS—SO2 emissions from coal-fired electric power 
plants were considered a likely contributor. A second, and probably more important, 
motive was a desire to narrow the disparity between the emission limits imposed on new 
sources by the NSPS and the limits imposed on existing sources by State Implementation 
Plans. If SO2 emissions were to be reduced for any of these reasons, something more than 
the existing regulatory structure would be needed since nearly all areas of the United 
States were in compliance with the SO2 NAAQS by the 1980s. Moreover, the use of tall 
stacks to loft SO2 emissions high above ground to avoid violating the ambient standard 
exacerbated the acidic deposition in more distant down-wind regions. A fifty percent 
reduction in the aggregate level of SO2 emissions came to be viewed as a measure that 
would at once significantly reduce the amount of SO2-originated deposition in the 
Northeast, contribute to some reduction of fine particulates, and largely close the 
disparity between the emission requirements imposed on new and existing sources. It is 
telling with respect to this last motive that the emission rate standard used to decide the 
cap and to allocate allowances in Phase II is identical to the original New Source 
Performance Standard enacted in the 1970 Amendments to the Clean Air Act. 
The third and final feature of the political and regulatory context surrounding 
enactment of the SO2 cap-and-trade program is that it ended a decade of debate 
concerning additional controls on existing coal-fired power plants. Earlier proposals 
would have achieved a similar 50% reduction of total SO2 emissions by mandating 
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scrubbers on the largest power plants and mandating switching to lower sulfur coal with 
limited trading. These earlier proposals were viewed as very costly, they faced the 
adamant opposition of the Reagan Administration, and they failed to gain a legislative 
majority in several sessions of Congress. The willingness of the new Bush (père) 
Administration to back significant SO2 emission reductions, so long as they were 
achieved by market-based mechanisms, and of some environmental lobbying groups, 
notably the Environmental Defense Fund, to experiment with new and potentially more 
effective means for achieving environmental goals broke the stalemate and allowed a 
legislative majority to coalesce around a proposal that would reduce aggregate SO2 
emissions significantly and achieve the disparate goals that motivated various actors in 
the political process.  
Institutional Location and Methodology 
Unless otherwise noted, this paper is based on the continuing ex post evaluation 
of the U.S. SO2 cap-and-trade program that faculty and students associated with the 
Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research (CEEPR) at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) have conducted since 1995. This effort was initially 
funded by the National Acid Precipitation Assessment Program (NAPAP) to support the 
1996 Quadrennial Report to the U.S. Congress and the research has received continued 
funding through grants from the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency and from the 
underlying financial support provided to CEEPR by a number of corporate sponsors. This 
evaluation has been a major focus of CEEPR’s research program, which aims to inform 
the public policy process by providing the results of objective, theoretically sound, and 
empirically rigorous research through publications and less formal presentations to 
interested audiences.  
The results of the first years of this research are presented comprehensively in 
Markets for Clean Air: The U.S. Acid Rain Program (Ellerman et al., 2000), which is 
cited by Smith (2001) as an example for conducting ex post evaluations. This paper 
updates Markets for Clean Air, and it incorporates more of the work of other researchers 
who have since published on various aspects of the program.  
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In specifying the requirements of an ex post evaluation, Smith (2001) seconded 
the reinforced the admonition of Frondel and Schmidt (2001) that “the essential task of 
any evaluation analysis is the construction of a credible counterfactual situation—a 
precise statement of what economic agents would have done in the absence of the policy 
intervention.” With this in mind, the rest of this section describes the counterfactuals used 
in evaluating the SO2 emissions trading program.  
Two counterfactuals are involved in assessing any emissions trading program: one 
to assess the amount and cost of the emission reduction and the other to assess the cost 
savings and other effects of trading. The counterfactual for assessing the emission 
reduction requires assumptions about basic economic drivers, such as the demand for 
electricity and the relative price of fuels, and about other environmental regulations that 
may limit emissions. These factors can be observed and used in formulating this first 
counterfactual. In the case of the SO2 program, the observed utilization of individual 
units provides a reasonably close estimate of the effect of the basic economic drivers in 
any given year. The effect of the pre-existing regulatory regime can be captured in the 
emission rate observed shortly before the start of the cap-and-trade program. 
Accordingly, the counterfactual used in this paper, as in previous work by the author and 
colleagues, is based on the heat input observed at affected units in each year and an 
unchanging pre-Title IV emission rate at those units.  
This counterfactual assumption has the effect of making the estimated emission 
reduction equal to the heat-input-weighted changes in observed emission rates at affected 
units and to assume that no emission reduction can be attributed to changes in demand, 
either at individual units or in the aggregate. Since the demand for electricity is price 
inelastic, the cost of SO2 controls is relatively small on a kilowatt-hour basis, and the 
major element determining the dispatch, or utilization, of individual generating plants is 
the cost of fuel, the error arising from assuming no effect on demand is probably small. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the added costs from the program reduce the demand for 
electricity or change the order of dispatch of generating units in meeting that demand, the 
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effect of the program is under-estimated.4  A more likely source of error arises from the 
assumption about the counterfactual emission rate. To the extent that other environmental 
regulations, or changes in relative fuel prices, cause the emission rate at affected units to 
fall during the period of evaluation, the effect of the SO2 program is over-estimated. 
Increases in the true counterfactual emission rates would have the opposite effect, but the 
scope for these is limited since all units face emission rate limits under the pre-existing 
command and control regulation and those limits are rarely, if ever, increased.  
The other counterfactual, that used to assess trading, is much harder to specify. 
This other counterfactual requires a hypothetical, equally effective, alternative program 
without emissions trading. Estimates of cost savings are necessarily more subjective since 
they depend directly on the degree of inefficiency assumed in the imagined alternative 
regime. In this paper, a source-specific, quantity limit equal to the allowance allocation to 
specific units is used. This assumption conforms with the well-established propensity to 
source-specific limits (although rarely on total emissions from an individual plant), but it 
is relatively benign in not having a technology mandate similar to that characterizing 
much of the existing regulatory structure and to that contained in earlier, failed legislative 
proposals. 
Economic efficiency 
Two aspects of economic efficiency need to be distinguished in evaluating cap-
and-trade programs. The first concerns trading among firms subject to the cap and the 
extent to which they realize the full cost savings attainable through emissions trading. 
The second aspect of economic efficiency concerns the broader welfare effects from the 
tax and regulatory interactions resulting from the treatment of abatement costs and the 
scarcity rents generated by the environmental constraint. From the standpoint of this 
second aspect, it has been argued that Title IV did not achieve full economic efficiency 
because first, allowances were not auctioned and the proceeds used to reduce 
                                                 
4 The appendix to Markets for Clean Air contains an econometric estimation of the extent to which Title IV 
requirements changed the dispatch of generating units during Phase I. In brief, the demand placed on 
unscrubbed units subject to Title IV was shifted to affected, scrubbed units and to non-affected, Phase II 
units. Both effects are relatively small and the latter did not increase emissions perceptibly since the 
emission rates for unscrubbed units under the cap in Phase I were generally higher than the emissions rates 
for non-affected units, all of which were exempt from Phase I because of a lower emission rate. 
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distortionary taxes on labor and capital, and second, the average cost rules applying to 
units remaining under public utility cost-of-service regulation prevent the full marginal 
cost of abatement from being passed on to customers in the price of electricity (Goulder 
et al., 1997). A full discussion of this aspect of the economic efficiency of Title IV would 
involve consideration of the practical likelihood of economically efficient recycling, of 
equitable concerns, and how public utility regulation is applied in practice: all topics that 
are beyond the scope of this paper. Henceforth, all references to economic efficiency in 
this paper refer to the conventional use in emissions trading, that is, to the cost savings 
resulting from the flexibility provided by emissions trading without regard to the larger 
welfare issues reflecting allocative inefficiencies that may result from the existing 
regulatory and tax system. 
The primary evidence for the economic efficiency of the SO2 cap-and-trade 
system lies in the early emergence of an allowance market and the significant amount of 
trading that has occurred since before the program started. Figure One depicts the 
movement of allowance prices from the earliest observations through late 2002 as 
reported monthly by various brokers and in the annual EPA auction. 
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 Prices have varied substantially over time—from an all-time low of $65 in early 
1996 to highs slightly above $200 in 1999 and again in 2001—but at any one moment in 
time a single price prevails. The earliest reported trades took place at widely disparate 
prices, which were higher than the clearing price in the first EPA auction, held in March 
1993. At this time, it would be hard to say that a market existed; however, by mid-1994, 
approximately six months before Phase I entered into effect, a market seems to have 
formed and the law of one price has prevailed since then.  
Since allowances are readily substitutable for abatement, this single price 
provides a common point of reference and a coordinating mechanism for all owners of 
affected sources in deciding whether to abate more or less at any one time and thereby to 
equalize the marginal cost of abatement. Moreover, the significant and increasing volume 
of trading between economically distinct organizations, as illustrated in Figure Two, 
suggests that utilities are taking advantage of the cost-saving opportunities provided by 
emissions trading. 
Figure 2: Annual Allowance Trading Activity 
 
Source: US EPA 
Since the equalization of marginal costs presumes a common price and trading 
among sources facing different costs, the preconditions for cost-effective abatement are 
being observed. An argument that the efficiency goals of the program are not being 
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achieved would require an alternative hypothesis to explain the existence of a market and 
the observed volume of trade. In fact, no observer argues that observed trades are 
motivated by other than expected cost savings. As will be discussed later in this paper, 
the only disagreement among analysts concerning the economic efficiency of the SO2 
cap-and-trade program concerns the extent to which the full potential cost savings have 
been achieved. 
Further evidence to support the argument for economic efficiency can be observed in the 
unit-level differences between allowances and emissions. The two panels of Figure Three 
show for Phase I affected units in 1999 and 2000 the emission rate that would be 
observed with no trading (the solid line) and the actual rate (the columns), given the heat 
input at each unit in these years. Few units are along the solid line, where they would 
have to be in the absence of trading, either when the allowance allocation is relative 
generous in 1999 or when the significantly reduced Phase II allocation went into effect. 
The average difference between observed emission rates and the no-trading rate is about 
50% of the mean emission rate:  0.81 #SO2/mmBtu over 1.64 #SO2/mmBtu in 1999 and 
0.86 #SO2/mmBtu over1.48 #SO2/mmBtu in 2000.  
A further indication of economic efficiency is given by the relatively small 
change in average emission rates (-10%) when the allowed emission rate declined by 
53%, from 1.85 #SO2/mmBtu in 1999 to 0.87 #SO2/mmBtu in 2000, when Phase II 
began.  This smaller change in emission rates could occur only with banking; and in fact 
these 375 units went from banking 1.8 million allowances in 1999 to drawing the 
accumulated bank down by 1.5 million tons in 2000. This pattern of aggregate abatement 
over time is characteristic of an optimal banking program with certainty, in which firms 
take future required abatement and prices into account in formulating current abatement 
plans. In turn, this behavior implies that allowance prices rise at the interest rate and 
abatement increases gradually over the entire banking period. Such a pattern is observed 
in the transition from Phase I to Phase II among the units affected in both years. 
Moreover, despite all the stochastic variation in allowance prices since early 1994, as 
shown in Figure One, a definite upward trend can be observed.  
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  Recent research by Ellerman and Montero (2002) confirms that in the aggregate 
banking has been surprisingly optimal. The surprise resides in the general consensus, 
voiced in Markets for Clean Air as well as elsewhere, that too much banking had 
occurred in Phase I. The explanation of the surprise lies in the discount rate applicable to 
SO2 allowances. The prices shown on Figure One allow a discount rate to be derived for 
SO2 allowances by application of the capital asset pricing model to determine the amount 
of undiversifiable risk associated with holding SO2 allowances. This risk is expressed by 
the correlation of returns from holding allowances (i.e., the monthly change in allowance 
prices) with returns from a well-diversified portfolio of equities over the same period of 
time. This correlation is zero, which makes SO2 allowances zero-beta assets that should 
be discounted at the risk-free rate for comparable holding periods.   
Compliance Costs and Savings from Emissions Trading 
While the emergence of an SO2 allowance market and the concomitant growth in 
the volume of SO2 allowance trading suggests strongly that cost savings are being 
realized, these data alone provide no estimates of the magnitude of the cost savings, nor 
of the relation of these savings to actual or avoided, command-and-control compliance 
costs. In the case of the Acid Rain Program, many assertions have been made about the 
cost savings, but only two rigorous ex-post evaluations of compliance cost have been 
made [Carlson et al., 2000; Ellerman et al, 2000; hereafter, CBCP (for the initials of the 
authors) and MCA (for Markets for Clean Air)]. These two studies agree in finding the 
more extreme claims of cost savings unfounded, and their estimates of actual compliance 
costs are approximately the same, but they differ concerning the extent of the cost 
savings in the early years, as well as in methodology.  
Ex Post Estimates of Compliance Cost 
In reviewing the debates about the cost savings from Title IV, two distinctly 
different definitions must be kept in mind: one, loosely defined but more repeated; the 
other, more rigorous but less frequently cited. The former defines the cost savings as the 
difference of actual observed costs from predicted costs. The difference is loosely 
attributed to emissions trading even though other factors can and did intervene to cause 
actual costs to be lower. The second definition, used by the two studies cited above, relies 
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upon a more rigorously defined no-trading alternative that incorporates identifiable cost-
reducing exogenous factors. Accordingly, the following discussion will discuss first the 
findings of the two studies on actual compliance cost, then compare them with earlier 
estimates, and finally address the differences between the two studies concerning the 
magnitude of the cost savings. 
CBCP and MCA agree roughly on the cost of compliance in the early years of the 
Acid Rain Program. The latter estimates the cost of compliance at $726 million in 1995 
and about $750 million in 1996, while the former places the cost at $832 million in 1995 
and $910 million in 1996, all stated in 1995 dollars. These estimates are not as far apart 
as they would seem. Complete comparability is not possible because of differences in 
methodology; however, both treat scrubber expense in the same manner.5 Although they 
largely agree on the fixed cost of scrubbers ($375 million in MCA and $382 million in 
CBCP), they differ significantly on the variable costs associated with scrubbers ($89 
million and $274 million, respectively).6 CBCP uses scrubber data that reflect pre-1995 
estimates of the variable cost of scrubbing, but the actual performance of the Phase I 
scrubbers has been much better than predicted, as will be discussed more fully in the 
section of this paper concerning dynamic aspects. Correction of this item alone largely 
removes the disparity in cost estimates between these two ex post evaluations. As an 
approximate figure, $750 million is probably a good estimate of the annual cost of 
abatement in the first years of Phase I.  
                                                 
5  MCA provides a bottom-up, plant-by-plant analysis based on reported capital costs and observed sulfur 
premia. CBCP conducts an econometric estimation of a translog cost function and share equations of unit-
level data for 734 non-scrubbed units over the 1985-94 period and then takes the resulting parameter values 
to form marginal abatement cost functions for individual units, which are then used to estimate actual costs 
based on observed 1995-96 emission levels. Scrubbed units are handled separately on a cost accounting 
basis using identical cost of capital and depreciation assumptions as in Ellerman et al. (2000). It should be 
noted that the estimation of 1995-96 cost in CBCP is almost an aside to the main purpose of the article 
which is to explain the reduction in abatement cost from pre-1995 estimates and to provide updated 
estimates of the cost of compliance in 2010. 
6 The numbers cited from CBCP are from their break-out of the costs of 2010 compliance. This estimate 
will be approximately the same as the scrubber costs in 1995-96 since the fixed costs are annualized over 
20 years, fuel costs are assumed not to change after 1995, the number of scrubbers remains unchanged, and 
costs are stated in 1995 dollars.  
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Comparison with Ex Ante Estimates of Cost 
The important difference, however, is not the minor one between CBCP and 
MCA concerning actual costs in 1995-96, but the larger one between these two careful ex 
post estimates and ex ante estimates of the same Phase I cost, as well as of predicted costs 
in Phase II. Most of the disparity between ex ante and ex post estimates reflects very 
different assumptions about the nature of proposed acid rain controls, the demand for 
electricity, and the relative availability and cost of low sulfur coal. For instance, the total 
annual costs associated with some of the early proposals to control acid rain precursor 
emissions were estimated at amounts ranging from $3.5 to $7.5 billion. Although the 
details of these earlier proposals varied, they generally mandated scrubbers at a 
significant number of units and allowed very limited emissions trading. Once the 
proposal that ultimately became Title IV was proposed (in 1989) and enacted (in 1990), 
the ex ante cost estimates for the fully phased-in program with trading fell to a range 
from $2.3 billion to $6.0 billion, with most of this variation reflecting varying 
assumptions about the extent to which emissions trading would be used.7 The now 
current estimates for compliance costs in 2010, as provided by CBCP and MCA, are 
significantly lower still, $1.0 billion and $1.4 billion, respectively, for what is the same 
program but updated to reflect more current market conditions.   
CBCP provides a very helpful quantification of the causes of the change between 
the early estimates of Title IV and the current estimates. In examining the changes over 
the period of their panel regression, 1985-94, they find that the marginal cost of 
abatement for a representative unit reduction has been approximately halved and that 
80% of the reduction in cost is attributable to falling price of low-sulfur coal relative to 
the price of high sulfur coal and that the remaining 20% is attributable to technological 
change. The change in the relative price of low sulfur coal is discussed in more detail in 
Ellerman and Montero (1998), who attribute the change to reduced rail rates, made 
                                                 
7 MCA includes (pp. 231-235) a discussion of the few ex ante estimates of Phase I costs and compares 
them with the MCA estimate of actual cost. Most of the variation in these estimates, made only a few years 
before Phase I began, reflects differing assumptions about the extent to which utilities made full use of the 
flexibility afforded by emissions trading. When compared on an average cost basis to account for 
differences in assumptions about the quantity of abatement, the MCA estimate of actual cost in 1995 was 
slightly above (3-15%) ex ante estimates assuming full use of emissions trading and 20-35% below 
estimates that assumed relatively little use of emissions trading.  
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possible by rail deregulation, for transporting distant, but cheap western coal to mid-
western markets where local, high-sulfur coal had predominated. They estimate that the 
switching of mid-western high sulfur coal units, most of whom were mandated to be 
subject to Title IV in Phase I, to lower sulfur western coal because the latter had become 
cheaper reduced the amount of abatement required to meet the Phase I cap by about 1.7 
million tons, or by about half of that predicted by early estimates of required abatement.  
Table 1 provides CBCP’s quantification of the effects of these exogenous changes 
on estimates of compliance costs for a fully phased-in Title IV program. 
Table 1: Total Cost of Compliance with Title IV in 2010 
(billion 1995 dollars) 
Cost Assumptions Command-and-Control Efficient Trading 
1989 Prices and Technology $2.67 $1.90 
1995 Prices and Technology $2.23 $1.51 
1995 Prices and 2010 Technology $1.82 $1.04 
Source: Carlson et al. (2000), Table 2, p. 1313 
 
The changes in relative fuel prices and technology between 1989 and 1995 lowered costs 
by about 20% and CBCP’s preferred estimate for 2010, which maintains 1995 relative 
fuel prices but extrapolates the 1985-94 rate of technological progress to 2010, reduces 
predicted costs by another third. The assumption of continued technological change also 
explains the difference between the CBCP and MCA estimates of Phase II annual cost, 
since the latter does not make any allowance for this factor.   
To summarize, most of the explanation for the lower than expected cost of Title 
IV is attributable to changes in the nature of the proposed controls, from prescribing 
technology to the flexibility of a cap-and-trade system, and to changes in related sectors 
of the economy that were reducing SO2 emissions anyway. As can be seen by comparing 
cells in Table 1, the difference in total cost between a relatively benign command-and-
control alternative and fully efficient trading accounts for a relatively small part of the 
difference from the earliest cost estimates, which remained for better or worse stuck in 
many observers’ mind. Moreover, the impression of dramatically lower costs was 
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reinforced by the price of SO2 allowances, which has been the most visible manifestation 
of cost to most observers. No one predicted the allowance prices of $100 and even less 
that occurred in late 1995 and for most of 1996. Most predictions of early Phase I 
allowance prices ranged between $250 and $400, prices that have yet to be realized. 
Furthermore, many casual observers remembered only the predictions of Phase II prices, 
usually after the bank had been drawn down, which ranged from $500 to as much as 
$1000. The very low, early 1996 allowance prices may have reflected an over-reaction to 
the correction in early expectations of market conditions; but, with eight years of 
experience with SO2 allowance trading, there seems little doubt now that changes in 
technology and the availability of low sulfur coal fundamentally changed the quantity and 
cost of abatement that would be required to comply with Title IV and shifted allowance 
prices commensurately lower.   
The Extent of Cost Savings from Trading 
The principal area of disagreement among analysts about the economic efficiency 
of the program concerns whether the full cost savings potential of emissions trading is 
being achieved. The point in dispute concerns the effect of cost-of-service regulation on 
the incentives of electric utilities to engage in trading with each other. The argument 
takes two forms: first, that conventional cost-of-service regulation provides no incentives 
to trade in the external market, since the gains would be passed on to rate-payers and 
losses might not be recoverable; and second, that public utility commissions have 
adopted policies that encourage sub-optimal choices by individual utilities, such as to 
scrub local high-sulfur coal in order to protect in-state jobs (Bohi and Burtraw, 1997; 
Rose, 1995; Rose, 2000). Research that simulates the effect of several of these 
disincentives suggests that compliance costs might be as much as doubled (Fullerton et 
al., 1997; Winebrake et al., 1995).  
Empirical research tending to confirm this effect has been published. The most 
striking result was that in CBCP which found that the actual cost of compliance with 
Title IV in 1995 and 1996 was slightly higher than the cost of compliance under a benign 
command-and-control alternative (quantity caps equal to allowances at each affected 
unit). Moreover, their estimate of total cost with fully efficient trading was some $200-
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$250 million lower. This finding indicated that the unrealized cost savings were 
substantial and implied that emissions trading had not resulted in any cost savings in the 
first two years of the program. The authors were quick to note that the volume of 
emissions trading was increasing and to state that they did not expect the apparent 
forsaking of the gains from emissions trading to last. More recently, Arimura (2002) has 
published research supporting the view that public utility commission regulation 
influenced abatement choices and contributed to low allowance prices.  
The contrasting point of view is associated with researchers at MIT and is stated 
most completely in MCA, although also published in earlier articles and working papers 
(Joskow et al.,1998; Schmalensee et al.,1998; Ellerman and Montero, 1998; and Bailey, 
1996).  Here, the findings are that a reasonably efficient allowance market emerged as 
early as mid-1994; trading volumes have increased significantly, even in the early years; 
the effect of state PUC rulings on trading activity is insignificant; and that cost savings 
have been realized.  
Much of the contrast between these two interpretations is a matter of tone, 
although substantive differences exist concerning the effect of PUC regulation on 
emissions trading. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore these differences in any 
detail, but a reader not already familiar with this debate should keep several points in 
mind.  
First, the argument on cost savings is as much one of whether the glass is half full 
or half empty. The MIT group makes no estimate of what the full cost savings might be 
and allows that some cost savings are undoubtedly unrealized, but they emphasize that 
cost savings have been realized and that no market is perfect. The MCA estimate of the 
cost savings in the early years of Phase I ($350 million, about half the observed cost of 
compliance) is derived from observed data assuming that the data reflect nearly efficient 
choices by abaters. In other words, this particular estimate assumes away the problem 
insisted on by the other school. This particular estimate was developed to discourage the 
then current views that the cost savings from emissions trading under Title IV were much 
greater. With the exception of the CBCP finding, the other camp does not dispute the 
existence of cost savings from Title IV. For instance, Bohi and Burtraw (1997) refer to 
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the “puzzle” of cost savings with limited trading and Rose (2000) concludes that Title IV 
shows that “trading mechanisms appear to be robust enough to allow substantial 
savings…to occur even when faced with less than ideal conditions.” The problem with 
the accuracy of the scrubber costs in the CBCP finding has already been mentioned, but 
even setting this aside, the focus in CBCP is more on quantifying the extent of unrealized 
cost savings as it is insisting that their less costly CAC alternative is realistic.8 Thus, one 
camp tends to emphasize the short-fall, while the other stresses the achievement. Still, a 
difference remains concerning magnitude. The difference is perhaps more aptly whether 
the glass is nearly full or only half full. 
A second point to be kept in mind is that the debate about regulatory influence is 
at bottom one about how public utility regulation works in practice. Although not so far 
publicly stated, the MIT group would not dispute the theoretical effect of the alleged 
influences; their contention would be that the theory of regulation applied is over-
simplified and not representative of the performance-based, rate-making as practiced in 
the 1990s. The only direct empirical test of the hypothesis of significant regulatory 
influence on emissions trading is Arimura (2002), which is unsatisfactory in attributing a 
difference found between the abatement decisions at Phase I units owned by the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, a publicly owned utility, and those owned by PUC-regulated 
utilities to test a hypothesis concerning differences between profit-maximizing firms and 
regulated electric utilities.     
Environmental effectiveness  
The arguments in favor of emissions trading programs always assume that trading 
will not jeopardize environmental effectiveness, and this is invariably the main concern 
of environmental groups and those who tend to be skeptical of emissions trading. The 
experience with Title IV has provided no grounds for concern about environmental 
effectiveness; in fact, the experience suggests that environmental performance may be 
better than that experienced with command-and-control analogues. This section of the 
                                                 
8 Still, their CAC counterfactual is identical to the one assumed in MCA, which is found to cost about 50% 
more than the observed cost of compliance. Also, the methodology adopted by CBCP would attribute the 
same change in scrubber cost to the CAC alternative so that the finding of no cost savings would still hold. 
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paper addresses this point, adduces the evidence indicating greater environmental 
effectiveness, and provides some tentative explanations for this result. 
An important first issue in evaluating environmental effectiveness is identifying 
the appropriate metric. The acid rain motivation of this program would suggest that an 
appropriate one would be the amount of wet deposition, or even the acidity of lakes and 
forests in sensitive regions; however, the most obvious and easily measured metric, total 
emissions, is the one typically used.  
No doubt surrounds the issue of whether SO2 emissions have been reduced.9 The 
two panels of Figure Four show actual emissions, the caps, and an estimate of 
counterfactual emissions for the 375 units first subject to Title IV in 1995 and for the 
much larger cohort of units that have been subject to Title IV since 2000. For both the 
Phase I and Phase II cohorts of units, the largest annual emission reduction is made in the 
first year, when the affected units first incur a cost for every ton of emissions. Given the 
phased-in nature of the requirement facing the Phase I units and the ability to bank, the 
annual reduction by these units was much greater than required. The annual reduction of 
emissions in 1995 was 3.9 million tons and that quantity of abatement has increased 
steadily and now stands at 6.3 million tons in 2001. Banking implies that emissions in the 
first years of Phase II will be greater than the allowances issued for these years, but the 
appropriate metric is the cumulative reduction since 1995, which has been 33.7 million 
tons, about 29% more than the 26.1 million tons that would have been required as of 
2001 without banking. By the end of Phase I, the actual cumulative reduction was twice 
what was required, and that ratio will now decline steadily to 1.0 when the accumulated 
Phase I bank will be exhausted, probably in the second half of this decade.  
 
                                                 
9 Suggestions to the contrary, such as those contained in Darkening Skies, a publication of the New York 
Public Interest Research Group, are misleading in citing specific plants and comparing 1999 emissions with 
1995 emissions. 
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Figure 4a. Phase I Unit Emissions, Caps, and Counterfactuals
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Figure 4b. Phase 2 Unit Emissions, Caps, and Counterfactuals
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The significant and accelerated reduction of emissions implies that the deposition 
of acidic particles has also fallen. The latest progress report from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (USEPA, 2002) reports that all of the conventional indicators relative 
to SO2 have declined markedly because of the Acid Rain Program. Figure 5 provides a 
graphic illustration of the change in wet sulfate deposition in the eastern U.S. between the 
late 1980s and the late 1990s.  
Figure 5:  Monitored Reduction in Wet Sulfate Deposition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar diagrams could be shown for ambient concentrations of SO2 and sulfate 
concentrations in the atmosphere, both of which have fallen generally across the 
Northeast and mid-Atlantic regions and in some places by as much as 50%. Sulfate 
concentrations in lakes and streams have declined significantly in all monitored regions 
of the Eastern United States, except Virginia, and in some areas, notably Pennsylvania 
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and the Adirondacks, the acid neutralizing capacity of the soil has begun to increase, 
which is an indication of the beginning of recovery in ecosystems suffering from 
acidification.  
Another aspect of the environmental effectiveness of the Acid Rain Program is 
the extent of compliance. With the exception of a few very small, new gas units in 2000, 
all generating units have been in compliance with Title IV requirements in all years. This 
record of virtually 100% compliance is not encountered with command-and-control 
regulation under which sources not infrequently receive various forms of dispensation 
that have the effect of delaying and sometimes permanently relaxing the applicability of 
the standard.  The reason is that a single standard imposes greater costs of some than on 
others because of differing site-specific considerations and these firms pleading unique 
hardship petition for administration relief that is often granted. Although such relief is 
may be justified in the interest of equity, compensating tighter standards are not imposed 
on firms facing relatively less onerous costs and these latter never step forward to assume 
a greater cost burden in the interest of equity, nor are regulators able to identify who they 
are and thus to impose compensating, more stringent standards on them. The information 
asymmetries between regulator and regulated in CAC systems effectively lead to a form 
of adverse selection that makes the standard less effective than it otherwise would be.  
This problem is avoided in a cap-and-trade system for two reasons. First, the 
market removes the rationale of unique hardship since the greatest burden borne by any is 
the price of an allowance; and, in a market with many buyers, no single one can claim to 
be uniquely disadvantaged. Second, the market provides at once a cheaper means of relief 
and the offset that preserves environmental integrity. Nothing prevents a firm from 
petitioning for relief from the requirement to surrender allowances, even if the grounds 
for doing so are weak; however, doing so can be costly and a market makes it cheaper 
simply to pay another to make the compensating reduction. In a sense, the ability to trade, 
and the market that it implies, renders special pleading uneconomic. 
A frequently voiced worry about the environmental effectiveness of emissions 
trading programs concerns “hot spots.” This phrase refers to the potential in a trading 
system for emission reductions to be transferred away from areas where emissions cause 
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greater damage to those where the emissions cause less damage. Well-designed programs 
would not have this problem since emissions would not be traded unless they had equal 
environmental effect; however, real programs contain unavoidable compromises and the 
SO2 program is no exception. The enabling myth of the acid rain program is that location 
does not count, when in fact from the standpoint of acid rain effects, location obviously 
does. The fear in the acid rain program is that emissions in the Midwest would not be 
reduced if utilities in this region could pay others located in parts of the country with little 
impact on the Northeast to reduce on their behalf.  
This fear has proved to be unfounded (Swift, 2000). Sources in the Midwest have 
provided about 80% of the emissions reduction achieved in Title IV while accounting for 
about 55% of emissions in 2000. It may be argued that emissions from the Midwest are 
still too high, but it can hardly be argued that emissions trading has allowed sources in 
the Midwest to avoid abating. A tendency to autarkic compliance in initial planning and a 
program incentive to scrub early also encouraged reductions in this region, but the more 
important reason appears to be that the cheapest abatement is to be found where the 
largest sources are located.  
This happy result is not accidental. Most deep abatement technology, like 
scrubbing, is capital intensive and the per-ton cost depends how many tons are removed 
per MWe of capacity. Higher utilization and higher sulfur content of the coal being 
burned means more tons of abatement over which the fixed capital cost can be spread and 
lower total cost per ton. Thus, where capital-intensive, deep-abatement technology is an 
option, market systems will direct abatement to relatively larger and more heavily 
utilized sources with relatively high sulfur coal. And, if these sources are the most 
damaging from an environmental standpoint, the experience with Title IV suggests they 
will be cleaned up first and that hot spots will not appear.   
Voluntary Aspects of Title IV10 
Title IV had several provisions that allowed sources of SO2 emissions outside of 
the cap to opt-in to the program. Such features are attractive as a further means of 
                                                 
10  The discussion of this section is based largely on the work of Juan-Pablo Montero (Montero, 1999, and 
Montero, 2000), which is summarized in chapter seven of Markets for Clean Air. 
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lowering program costs if sources that are excluded from the cap are able to provide 
cheaper abatement. In the case of Title IV, certain utility sources that were not required to 
be under the cap until Phase II could opt-in to Phase I, and non-utility sources that were 
otherwise not a part of the program could do so in either phase.11 The response of these 
two groups was very different: many eligible utility sources opted-in, while few industrial 
sources did so.  The response of the utility sources also revealed an unavoidable trade-off 
between the economic and environmental objectives of the basic program.  
The theory underlying voluntary features is obvious enough: if the aggregate cap 
is set optimally and non-capped sources can reduce emissions at lower marginal cost than 
the price of allowances traded among capped sources, then costs are reduced without 
harm to the environmental objective by allowing non-capped sources with lower 
marginal costs to opt-in. In Title IV, sources opting-in received allowances equal, in 
theory, to what emissions would have been without participation and were then held to 
the same compliance requirements as capped sources.12 The manner of opting-in implied 
both that emissions were monitored and that the opt-in unit’s counterfactual emissions 
would be accurately determined. This meant that continuous emissions monitoring 
systems, or an equivalent system, would have to be in place and that counterfactual 
baselines would have to be established. The differing responses and the revealed trade-off 
can be traced back to these two problems of implementation.  
Over 200 electric utility units opted-in for one or more years of Phase I, and 110 
of them participated in all five years. In contrast, only a few industrial sources chose to 
opt-in to the program. The different response is largely explained by the differences in 
transaction costs for each category of participant (Atkeson, 1997). Industrial sources that 
considered participation but decided not to do so cited the costs of monitoring as the 
largest consideration. Moreover, the few that did participate already had monitoring 
                                                 
11 The legislative and regulatory provisions for industrial units are known as the Industrial Opt-in Program 
and utility units fell under the substitution or compensation provisions; however, all are referred to here as 
voluntary or opt-in participants. Electric utility units eligible for opting-in to Phase I were those owned by 
utilities with other units mandated to be part of Phase I. Provisions were included for opting-in units owned 
by a utility without Phase I units through contract with a utility having Phase I units, but these contract 
provisions were little utilized.  
12 Note that this mode of voluntary participation is different from many instances in which tradable credits 
are issued only for the emissions avoided.  Thus, most of the allowances issued to opt-in units were needed 
to cover emissions from these units. 
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equipment in place as a result of other environmental requirements or otherwise did not 
need to install monitors.13 This obstacle was not faced by eligible electric utility units 
because all sources subject to the Acid Rain Program were required to install a 
continuous emission monitoring system by 1995 regardless of whether the unit was 
required to participate in Phase I beginning in 1995 or in Phase II beginning in 2000. 
Also, the utilities owning the units eligible for becoming substitution and compensation 
units in Phase I were already incurring the overhead costs of managing emissions and 
accounting for allowances. Finally, electric utility units did not need to establish a 
baseline. The number of allowances that would be granted to eligible electric utility units 
was pre-determined by a set of mathematical formulae that were similar to those used for 
units required to participate in Phase I. As a result of all these factors, the additional costs 
of participation were very low for eligible electric utility units and a significant number 
of them volunteered.14 In contrast, industrial sources would have had to incur the costs of 
monitoring emissions in addition to those of establishing a baseline and keeping track of 
allowances and emissions. These transaction costs were greater than the potential gains 
from trading that would have been possible through voluntary participation. 
While the voluntary participation in the Acid Rain Program was heartening, an 
analysis of which eligible units opted in and which did not reveal a strong element of 
adverse selection, which resulted from the impossibility of specifying a true 
contemporaneous baseline (Montero, 1999). The pre-specified baseline, which greatly 
reduced transaction costs, relied mostly on 1989-90 data; however, changes in coal 
markets and in the utilization of electric generating units in the intervening years caused 
the true counterfactual emissions for eligible units in 1995-99 to be different. Thus, units 
that had already switched to lower sulfur coal for purely economic reasons because of 
changes in coal markets tended to opt-in and to receive some allowances in excess of 
                                                 
13 For instance, in one case, an electric utility subject to the program undertook to provide steam and power 
to an industrial facility thereby allowing that facility to shut down the boilers it had previously used to 
generate electricity and steam. Allowances equal to what the closed down facilities would have produced in 
supplying the ongoing needs of the industrial facility were then awarded to the electric utility providing the 
facility’s power and steam needs.  
14 A further consideration was motivating electric utility participation was the NOx grandfathering 
provision. Units with certain types of boilers could be grandfathered from Title IV’s Phase II NOx emission 
limits if they participated in the SO2 program in 1995. While many did, these units generally did not 
receive excess allowances and were not part of the adverse selection problem that characterized most 
electric utility opt-in units. 
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what might be considered the true baseline. And those who might have had low cost 
abatement to offer but whose emissions had risen above the pre-specified baseline tended 
not to opt-in since they would incur the costs of reducing emissions to the baseline before 
they would receive any benefits from emissions trading. The end result was that the units 
opting in were not so much low cost abaters, although some may have been, as they were 
units that were abating anyway. 
This problem of adverse selection was exacerbated by allowing the owners of 
eligible units to wait until November 30 of each year to decide whether to opt-in for that 
year and to take the unit out of the program in the following year if opting-in would be 
disadvantageous. While many eligible units remained in the program for the entire five 
years of Phase I, a number of units can be observed opting in and out according to 
whether emissions were higher or lower than the allowances they would receive by 
opting in.   
While the evidence of this selection bias is very strong, the environmental effects 
from the loosening of the Title IV cap must be kept in perspective. The number of 
allowances that could be considered excess amounted to only 3% of the total issued 
during 1995-99 and the inflation of the cap during Phase II, when these allowances will 
be used is only about 2%. These magnitudes are not great and they cannot be said to have 
threatened the overall integrity of the SO2 cap. In addition, many of the units opting in 
also abated emissions in response to allowance prices and thereby contributed some cost 
savings to the program. Whether these cost savings were greater than the reduced 
environmental benefit depends greatly on the assumption about the true but unobservable 
baseline. In summary, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the environmental damage 
was not great, but neither was the economic benefit, and that on balance, the voluntary 
features of Title IV were not worth the extra administrative effort.15   
                                                 
15 See Ellerman et al. (forthcoming) for an argument that this conclusion, which results from a balancing of 
costs and benefits, ought not to be carried over to potential applications of emissions trading for the control 
of greenhouse gases. 
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Dynamic effects  
Theoretical work has long predicted that market-based instruments, such as a cap-
and-trade program, would provide greater impetus to innovation than command-and-
control regulation, and thus add another cost-reducing attribute to these instruments 
(Magat, 1978; Milliman and Prince, 1989). Title IV has provided the occasion for testing 
this theoretical prediction and there is plenty of anecdotal evidence of what could be 
interpreted as innovation. Nevertheless, there is only one study that has attempted to 
address this issue rigorously and its results provide some confirmation, but not much 
(Popp, 2001). It may be still too early to be able to test the hypothesis confidently; and, 
under the best of circumstances, the difficulty of disentangling the effects of the 
regulatory instrument from exogenous technological change is great. Accordingly, in ths 
section, the term, dynamic effects, is interpreted broadly to encompass factors other than 
the direct trading of emission rights that contribute to lower compliance cost. 
In considering dynamic effects, it is natural to focus of flue gas desulfurization, or 
scrubbers, since they are capable of removing 95% or more of SO2 emissions from the 
stack, they are commercially available and widely used, and they are costly. Moreover, 
the total costs of scrubbing for the Title IV scrubbers installed at the beginning of Phase I 
has been less than predicted and a second cohort of Title IV scrubbers that have come on 
line at the start of Phase II have shown even lower cost. The key components of this 
change in cost are given in Table 2.   
 
Table 2: Evolution of Scrubber Costs 
 Ex Ante Phase I Ex Post Phase I Phase II 
Initial Capital Cost ($/KWe) $240 $249 $150 
Tons SO2 Removed per MWe 99 137 137 
Per ton Fixed Cost ($/ton) $273 $206 $124 
Fixed O & M Cost ($/ton) $75 $15 $15 
Variable O & M Cost ($/ton) $116 $65 $65 
Total Cost per ton ($/ton) $464 $286 $204 
Source: MCA, Table 9.3 at p. 236 and discussion on p. 240. 
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The costs of scrubbing can be broken down into three components: 1) the initial 
capital cost, conventionally expressed as dollars per kilowatt of capacity, 2) the tons of 
SO2 removed per unit of capacity over some period, which depends on the sulfur content 
of the coal and the utilization of the scrubber, and 3) the O&M costs, which are often 
expressed as cents per kilowatt-hour but are more properly stated as dollars per ton 
removed. Ex ante estimates for the cost of scrubbing a retrofitted Phase I unit typically 
fell between $400/ton and $500/ton, but ex post average cost has been below $300 a ton, 
well above allowance prices, but not as uneconomic as often assumed. And this average 
masks huge variation, from a few units with apparent costs higher than $500/ton to 
several with costs around $200/ton. As shown in Table 2, the calculated 33% reduction in 
average cost was due not to lower initial capital costs, which were as expected, but to 
25% higher utilization of the retrofitted units and a halving of operating and maintenance 
costs from what had been predicted. Operating costs were lower mostly because of 
improved instrumentation and control, which reduced the parasitic loss of power and 
manpower requirements, and it is probable that this improvement was a reflection of 
broader changes in information technology that were occurring throughout the economy. 
The more interesting change from the standpoint of the effects of Title IV was the 
increase in utilization from 65% of total hours to 85%. This shift in dispatch reflected the 
effects of the sulfur premium that appeared in coal markets across the entire sulfur 
gradient and which tended to be equal (when appropriately converted) to the price of 
allowances. Whereas the only coal receiving a sulfur premium prior to Title IV was 
“compliance” coal, that required in generating units meeting the pre-1978 NSPS by 
burning coal with less than 1.2 #SO2/mmBtu, a sulfur premium now extended across the 
entire range of sulfur content. This differentiation in the prices of coals having more than 
1.2#SO2/mmBtu had other consequences that will be discussed below, but it had two 
effects that influenced the utilization of units with retrofitted scrubbers. Since the sulfur 
premium and allowance prices tend to equality and allowance prices were higher than the 
variable cost of scrubbing, a scrubbed unit would have lower marginal cost for generating 
electricity than an unscrubbed unit, if all else were equal. The second effect, and 
undoubtedly the more important one, reflected the change in fuel cost, the major 
component in the variable cost of generating electricity, due to the new sulfur premium. 
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Unscrubbed units, typically burning mid- to low-sulfur coals, found themselves facing 
not only higher marginal abatement costs, but also higher fuel costs relative to scrubbed 
units, which would typically burn the higher sulfur coals that were now cheaper relative 
to coals with lower sulfur content.16 Thus, the lower cost of scrubbing observed in Phase 
I is not the result of new technology but of the new requirement that the cost of emitting 
sulfur dioxide to be incorporated into operating costs in a systematic way.17 
After the first cohort of Phase I scrubbers, vendors touted a reduction in capital 
cost for follow-on scrubbers, and these claims became real in 1998 when allowance 
prices rose to $200 and scrubber retrofits were announced for eight additional units, 
which are now online. Many of these units came in with initial capital costs around 
$100/KWe (which implied total costs below $200/ton), but these units were able to 
achieve cost savings because of previously installed scrubbers at other units at the same 
generating plant.  The total cost indicated for Phase II scrubbers provides a good estimate 
of the long-run marginal cost of SO2 removal by scrubbing, but that cost will rise as the 
scrubbers are retrofitted to units that are less utilized and burning lower sulfur fuels 
(Ellerman and Joskow, forthcoming). Nevertheless, it is clear that there has been a large 
reduction in the cost of scrubbing, and the question is whether this can be attributed to 
Title IV. 
The only research so far to address this question explicitly is Popp (2001) who 
compared patents relating to scrubbers from the early 1970s through 1997 with scrubber 
performance as reported in annual submissions to the Energy Information 
Administration. He finds that the passage of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments did not 
increase the level of innovative activity, and that in fact it fell somewhat, but that the 
nature of innovation did change in a more environmentally beneficial way. Throughout 
the period, the continuing level of innovative activity led to lower operating cost, but the 
patents granted after 1990 are associated with an improvement in removal efficiency that 
had remained constant previously. Popp’s finding conflicts in part with those of two other 
                                                 
16 This effect applies only to scrubbed units. Unscrubbed units burning higher sulfur coals would pay less 
for fuel but require more allowances and on balance enjoy no advantage over unscrubbed units burning 
lower sulfur coals. 
17 As exemplified by the compliance coal phenomenon, the costs of complying with environmental 
regulations often entered into marginal cost decisions, but it was not systematic as it became after the 
introduction of SO2 allowances. 
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studies of changes in scrubber technology (Bellas, 1998; and Taylor et al., 2001). Bellas 
examined the same cost data as Popp but only through 1992 and found “no significant 
progress…in abatement technology,” which he associated with “the small incentives for 
innovation [associated with] the form of regulation typically used in the U.S.” Taylor et 
al. (2001) examine a slightly different question in seeking to determine the relative 
efficacy of R&D spending and regulatory constraint in inducing innovative activity 
related to scrubbers, and in doing so they find the same decline in patent activity as Popp 
but a continual increase in removal efficiency as well as a steady decline in capital cost, 
both of which are attributed to “learning by doing.”18 These interesting but conflicting 
results concerning the trend in scrubber costs do not provide very solid ground for 
attributing dynamic effects, as usually defined, to Title IV. 
While scrubbing can be considered the backstop technology for SO2 abatement, it 
is not the only way, and it accounts for relatively less (40%) of the total reduction in SO2 
emissions in Title IV than switching to lower sulfur coal. Cost reductions in switching are 
not as easy to document, since switching does not attract the same attention as installing a 
scrubber, but cost-reducing changes can be inferred, most of all in the ability of boilers 
built to fire bituminous Mid-western coals to accommodate lower sulfur, sub-bituminous 
coal from the West. It was always recognized that these units could be converted to the 
use of sub-bituminous coals, but the higher water and ash content of the latter would lead 
to a significant derating, or reduction, in the generating capacity of the unit. As a result, it 
was expected that the predominantly high-sulfur burning units in the Midwest would 
either install scrubbers or switch to low-sulfur bituminous coal produced in the 
Appalachian region. As the effects of rail deregulation increasingly reduced the 
significant transportation component in the cost of western low sulfur, sub-bituminous 
coals delivered to the Midwest, power plant engineers began to experiment with blending 
these coals with locally produced high-sulfur bituminous coals. While a 100% conversion 
to a sub-bituminous would result in a derating, it was equally evident that a 1% blend 
would have little effect and the operational question became at what mixture did the unit 
start to experience a reduction in operating efficiency. In what must be seen as a triumph 
                                                 
18 Popp (2002) and Taylor et al. (2001) use the patent data in different ways. Popp constructs a “stock of 
knowledge” using various diffusion and decay assumptions as the independent variable while Taylor et al. 
rely on the annual count of patent grants. 
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of continuous thinking, the answer emerged that, depending on the unit and the coals 
being blended, mixtures of up to 60% of low-sulfur, sub-bituminous coal (and sometimes 
higher) could be used without significant derating in the generating capacity of the unit.  
This re-engineering of existing bituminous coal-burning units to accommodate 
significant blends of low-sulfur, sub-bituminous coal could be considered an innovation. 
It was not observed before and not expected, but it can be seen also as diffusion of 
already known techniques for which there was previously no incentive to apply. It is clear 
that the previous regulatory instruments, which either mandated scrubbers or low sulfur 
coal, removed any incentive for experimenting with these blends which resulted in a coal 
of lower sulfur content (without being low sulfur coal) at much less cost than scrubbing 
or switching to a low-sulfur bituminous coal from Appalachia. The net effect was a lower 
sulfur premium for Appalachian low sulfur coal, consequent lower costs for switching in 
regions to the east beyond the economic frontier for western low-sulfur coals, and a lower 
allowance price. 
Other cost-reducing changes that might be termed innovations can be observed 
upstream of the power plant in response to the sulfur premium. Mid-sulfur coal mines 
were developed in the Midwest where none existed before. These could supply a local 
coal at a price competitive with western blends, but when the only sulfur premium paid 
was for coal less than 1.2#SO2/mmBtu, these mines could not compete with the lower 
cost but higher sulfur mines in the Midwest and were therefore not developed before. A 
similar shifting downward of the average sulfur content of coal being supplied was 
observed in Northern Appalachia, the other high-sulfur coal-producing region. These 
changes in coal supply to somewhat lower sulfur coals, which would still be considered 
mid- or high-sulfur coals, account for about 36% of the total reduction attributable to 
switching, or somewhat more than one fifth of the total. The causes were new mines now 
made economic in local markets, changes in mining practices that reduced the sulfur 
content of coal being already mined, and increased sulfur removal in coal preparation 
plants. The incentive for all of these changes was that premium now paid for lower sulfur 
content across the entire sulfur gradient. Whether these opportunities were known before 
to geologists, mining engineers, and prep plant operators and only needed the incentive to 
bring them forth awaits further research, but the answer will determine whether these 
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innovative changes can be considered a change in the menu of technological options 
induced by Title IV or simply the diffusion of known techniques once the incentive was 
in place. 
One further contribution of Title IV to lower cost that does not involve innovation 
is noted in Burtraw (1996) and labeled cost savings without emissions trading. Burtraw 
noted that giving plants the ability to choose between scrubbing, switching, and 
purchasing allowances created a competition among suppliers of abatement that was not 
present before. The threat to purchase allowances implies some trading to be credible, but 
it would not require a fully developed market and even without this threat, the ability to 
choose between switching and scrubbing increased competition and contributed to lower 
costs.  
What emerges from the experience with Title IV is that costs are lower for 
reasons beyond the ability to trade emission reductions among sources. Improvements in 
productivity were occurring throughout the American economy during this period and 
Carlson et al. (2000) find that unspecified, exogenous productivity improvement applied 
to SO2 abatement as well and accounted for as much as 20% of the reduction in the cost 
between 1985 and 1994. Quite aside from this background trend, a variety of industry 
sources indicate that the ability to trade emissions, and actual trading, have had effects in 
upstream markets and on the choice of technique that can be directly attributable to the 
flexibility that is inherent in market-based approaches to air emission regulation. Whether 
these changes, which often look like innovation, are true changes of the technical choices 
facing firms or simply the diffusion of known technology in response to the right 
incentive awaits further research. It is clear that costs are lower than expected for reasons 
beyond the extent of actual trading and that these changes were not expected.   
Other Costs and Effects 
All air emission control programs involve costs and effects beyond the directly 
observable abatement costs and the concomitant reduction in emissions. In the Acid Rain 
Program, administrative costs for both the regulator and the regulated are believed to 
have been less than in conventional regulatory programs, but no comprehensive study has 
been conducted on this subject. The more important aspect of the program’s 
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administration concerns the revolutionary change in the nature of the tasks that are now 
required of the regulator and the regulated (Kruger, McLean, and Chen, 2000).   
The shift of regulatory instrument from site-specific mandates to cap-and-trade 
has been accompanied by a corresponding shift in enforcement from relatively labor-
intensive but intermittent inspection to data-intensive but continuous measurement and 
accounting. When what each source is doing to abate matters to the regulator, a corps of 
inspectors is needed to check periodically on the performance of the regulated. In a cap-
and-trade system, the requirement that allowances be surrendered for all emissions 
permits the regulator to be indifferent about each source’s abatement, and therefore to do 
without the corps of inspectors (except for the monitors); however, the quid pro quo is 
continuous measurement and reporting of emissions. In turn, this requires the handling of 
more data and a greater focus on accounting than was true of more conventional 
regulation. 
The hallmark of the new system of regulation is continuous emissions monitoring 
and these monitors impose a non-negligible cost on operators that is estimated at 7% of 
direct compliance cost (MCA, pp. 248-50). As shown by Atkeson (1997) in her study of 
Title IV opt-in candidates, this cost can be a significant deterrent to voluntary 
participation. In the case of electric utility units subject to Title IV, continuous emissions 
monitoring and reporting was mandated for SO2, NOx and CO2. To the extent that the 
information from these systems is used for the implementation of other air emission 
control programs, such as the Title IV NOx averaging program or the Northeastern NOx 
Budget Program, or that the data provide benefits aside from compliance uses, this cost 
should be shared with those other uses. Nevertheless, the experience with Title IV makes 
clear that the cost of this prerequisite for emissions trading is not negligible. 
The administrative costs incurred by EPA are recognized as being less although of 
a different nature. Kruger, McLean and Chen (2000) describe the significant data 
handling requirements that are now faced and they suggest that this would not have been 
much more costly before recent advances in computing and data management. Despite 
this change of the nature of regulatory activity, the number of people involved in 
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administering the program is a third [get McLean quote] of what would be required for a 
more conventional air emission control program.  
Although no researcher has attempted to address the issue, the administrative 
costs of the cap-and-trade program for the regulated are not as clearly less than with 
conventional regulatory means. The cost of continuous emissions monitoring is the main 
item in this accounting. As is the case for the regulator, corporate administrative 
resources are shifted to emissions reporting and allowance management, but a good 
comparison of how these costs compare with what is required for dealing with inspectors 
and reporting under conventional command-and-control systems has not been made. It 
may not be any greater, but it is not clearly less. Whatever the case, regulated firms seem 
to be unanimous in expressing their preference for this type of regulation, presumably 
because the gains in reduced, direct compliance costs more than offset whatever 
additional costs are involved in monitoring and allowance management.   
Another notable achievement in the realm of other costs is the notable reduction 
in the transaction costs involved in trading. The creation of a standard unit of account in 
allowances and the lack of any review requirement for trading has avoided the very large 
transactions costs that limited EPA’s earlier experiments with emissions trading 
(Ellerman et al., forthcoming; Kruger, McLean, and Chen, 2000). The right to emit has 
been made into a readily tradable commodity and broker commissions are 
correspondingly low. This feature has, of course, greatly facilitated the development of a 
market and the concomitant cost savings. 
Two effects of the Acid Rain Program that are not related to ancillary costs are 
also important. The first has been the creation of institutions with a continuing interest in 
emissions trading. The emergence of intermediaries, such as brokers, banks, and others 
who can offer trading and risk-management services, has already been mentioned. And, 
as is perhaps inevitable for any economic activity of note, an association has been 
formed, the Emissions Marketing Association, to promote emissions trading through a 
variety of educational, lobbying, informational, and other out-reach programs. Finally, 
there seems to be no end to the conferences, meetings, and workshops that bring 
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participants from the private and public sectors and academia together to discuss one 
aspect or another of emissions trading. 
While this institutionalization of emissions trading has occurred, somewhat of a 
backlash has also emerged recently as represented by Clear the Air (2002) and Moore 
(2002). The latter succinctly states the position of these groups: “trading ought to be 
rejected when proposed and repealed where it now exists” (p. 2). Both of these purported 
studies are lobbying documents occasioned by the Bush Administration’s Clear Skies 
Proposal, which in addition to lowering the SO2 cap by two-thirds and instituting national 
NOx and mercury caps would effectively exempt units subject to these proposed caps 
from the best available control technology requirements of the existing Clean Air Act. 
Based on the experience with Title IV, one might conclude that this is a good trade-off, as 
advanced by some academics (Ellerman and Joskow, 2000) and as suggested by the 
publications of some environmental organizations (Goffman and Dudek, 1995; 
Environmental Defense, 2000) and researchers at some environmentally oriented research 
organizations (Swift, 2000; Swift, 2001), but this is far from a universally shared view 
among the environmental community. The reasons for rejecting emissions trading are 
beyond the scope of this paper but disdain for pollutant trading as morally reprehensible 
and concern for the loss of administrative discretion (and its many uses for non-
environmental purposes) are always present. Although these attitudes may be viewed as a 
rear-guard reaction to an increasingly dominant consensus, they do find an echo on the 
editorial page of the New York Times and they have been translated into a law in New 
York that would restrict emissions trading. In what is perhaps an example of the new 
institutions, this state law has been struck down in the federal court as a violation of the 
interstate commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution in a motion for summary judgment 
brought by members of the Emissions Trading Association. [Get references on above]  
Conclusions and Implications  
The experience with Title IV and, to a lesser extent, other cap-and-trade programs 
marks a turning point in the regulation of air emissions in the U.S. This experience has 
shown that market-based incentive systems can reduce emissions as effectively, and even 
more so, and at considerably less cost than through conventional command-and-control 
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mandates. As it result, it has become virtually obligatory that any legislative proposal to 
limit air emissions in the U.S. include emissions trading. While the agreement of left and 
right in the political spectrum is not as complete as it may appear on the surface, there 
seems little doubt that emissions trading will play an increasing role in the regulation of 
air emissions in the U.S. and probably elsewhere.   
The conventional wisdom is that emissions trading will be necessary for new 
emission control initiatives and that the existing structure of command-and-control 
regulation is sacrosanct. Hence, all legislative proposals granting new authority to 
regulate air emissions include emissions trading; yet, their passage has been no faster for 
this reason. The same issues of cost and benefit and the same imperatives of building a 
viable political consensus remain. While legislative proposals that include emissions 
trading do not appear to be going anywhere fast, a less noticed and potentially more 
important change is occurring. Cap-and-trade systems are being adopted as a preferred 
means for achieving environmental goals for which ample legislative and regulatory 
authority already exists. The RECLAIM and Northeastern NOx Budget Programs, as well 
as the NOx SIO call, are instances of cap-and-trade programs being implemented within 
existing regulatory authority.  This trend is in keeping with the reliance on market forces 
that has become manifest in one regulatory domain after another and it indicates that the 
increased use of cap-and-trade programs may occur as much through such incremental 
changes in the existing command-and-control structure than through bold new advances 
in the legislative domain. 
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